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Abstract 
In this paper, I undertake a comparative analysis of the authoritarian 
process in Venezuela and Turkey. In both countries, there are signs of political and 
economic instabilities. Therefore, I examine Turkey's and Venezuela's politics and 
economy to understand the reasons for authoritarian regimes. The comparison 
reveals that both countries are en route of authoritarianism; however, the motives 
are d ifferent. As for Venezuela. comparison grounds the argument that their 
authoritativeness relies on ecor.omic instability. On the contrary, Turkey has a 
stable economy while it has been struggling with political upheavals. 
The result of this study pinpoints different ways for authoritarian regimes. 
Even though authoritarian motives originated from different reasons, both 
countries approach an authoritarian regime. As a result, research suggests that 
. . 
Venezuela and Turkey are disadvantaged countries as democracies. 
• , \  
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Chapter 1 :  Introduction 
One of the most difficult challenges is to describe and measure democracy 
because it has been defined in many different ways (Collier and Levitsky 1 997; 
Coppedge 2012). Coppedge (2012) claims that definition of democracy fits into 
one of six overlapping models: liberal, deliberative, representative, participatory, 
socioeconomic and people's democracy. Therefore, agreeing on a definition of 
democracy is difficult. What we know is that the dictionary definition of democracy 
is "a system of a government, in which the supreme power is vested in the people 
and exercised by every citizen directly Oi indirectly through a system of 
representation usually involving periodically held free election to vote and elect its 
governmental officials."(Merriam-Webster 201 8). However, as Coppedge claimed 
. . 
that the elections are not the only component to being a democratic country; more 
is needed for a country to be called a· democracy (Coppedge et al. 201 1) .  Although 
various credible international institutions define democracy differently, it is 
generally measured by five categories: electoral process, executive-legislative 
relations (functioning of government), political culture (corruption, lack of press 
freedom), judiciary and public-government relations (Eckhardt 1 991 ). 
In comparison to democracy, authoritarianism is a form of government 
characterized by a strong central power and limited representation for citizens. A 
pioneer in the study of authoritarian systems of government, Luan J.Linz, 
examined authoritarian regimes using four characteristics: political pluralism, 
legitimacy, social mobilization and shifted executive power (Francisco 200·1). 
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Since democracy and authoritarianism are direct opposite forms of each 
other, authoritarian regimes and the democratization process have attracted 
political science scholars for decades. After the democratization process began in 
the wwld, scholar� shifted their studies to how authoritarian governments develop 
irito democratic ones. However, numerous democra.tic countries have begun to 
turn toward authoritarianism. In recent days, some scholars, like Diamond and 
Plattner. believe that "Authoritarianism Goes Global" (Diamond, Plattner, and 
Walker 2016). Therefore, it can be said that the struggle for democracy is 
intensifying in many places around the world. 
In that case, it can be inquired: While democracy is a popular form of 
government in the contemporary world and it gives freedom to choose to the 
people, why are there still some authoritarian or semi-democratic (hybrid regimes) 
countries in the wo"rld (Ekman 2009)? Economics, politics," and religion could 
account for the transition from democracy to authoritarianism. So, what are the 
dynamics beyond this tendency of authoritativeness then? 
Birth Of Democracy 
The debate between authoritarianism and democracy originated from the 
debate between idealists, like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and realists, like Thomas 
Hobbes. Rousseau argued that our natural condition is one of peace and harmony 
and that democracy is the way we make our social life reflect our egalitarian nature 
(Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1 762). Thomas Hobbes claimed in his book, Leviathan 
8 
that "the war of all against all" (HQbbes 1 651 , chap. XII I) 1 is the human condition. 
individuals are born as enemies and pursue only their own interest with eagerness 
(Hobbes 1 651 ) .  Both philosophers would be right because like a child, each person 
cries for both freedom and security. The need for security makes humankind 
miserable and enemies. The need for security necessitates the creation of an 
institution-government that takes care of the needs of people. However, Thomas 
Jefferson clearly stated in the American declaration of independence that human 
beings are free and equal by nature, and government as an institution serves only 
to guarantee those natural rights (The Declaration of Independence 2001).  This 
debate also demonstrates that the struggle within humanity turns out to be the 
struggle for democracy. 
Democracy is not well-ordered. It is rough, blusterous, a messy form of 
political' life but it is its nature. Montesquieu even claimed that when one finds an 
orderly and quiet place, one will find the tyranny. "Whenever voices are raised in 
a debate, where there are uproar and unceasing talk, where" men and women 
bewilder t.heir way to solve for permanent problems for themselves, we can feel 
. . 
assured that we are on the way of precious democracy" (Secondat Charles de 
1 748, Quated in Struggle for Democracy, 1988 ) . Democracy is final:y- more than 
any other form of government- about people, just plain people. 
: . 
1 In Latin, "The war of all against all" is Bellum omnium contra omnes. This phrase was 
written in De Give (1642) and Leviathan (1651) by Thomas Hobbes to describe hllman 
existence in the state of nature. 
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The birth of democracy. occurred centuries ago. Historians believe that 
evolution through tyranny to democracy dates back to the sixth century B.C. 
(Robert K. Fleck and Hanssen 2010). In these somber times, when the governance 
was in privileged aristocrats' power, many things started changing with the election 
of a statesman, Solon, who had an jdealist vision (The Editors of Encylopedia 
Britannica 1 998). By his idealist vision, he introduced many reforms that initiated 
the transforri}ation of Ath.ens and the world (Fornara and Samons I I  1991).  The 
most important factor was that his reform provided the dispersal of the tribes and 
clans which had always driven the Athenians into conflict. Granting citizens the 
option to manage their own debts was the first freedom for citizens. (The Editors 
of Encylopadia Britannica 1998). Although those reforms did not bring complete 
democracy, the ground was prepared for it (Fornara and Samons II 1991 ,  38). After 
Solon and his successor Pisistratus's reforms, Greece was still under the 
domination of Persians in 508 B.C. In that time, Athens' last law-giver, Cleisthenes, 
appeared (Robinson 1945). While Solon and Pisistratus diminished the power of 
clans, it can be claimed that Cleisthenes changed the way of using power. He 
separated the clans and tribes, creating specific places for each of them. He 
created artificial tribes and each tribe was divided into demes. Those demes were 
spread throughout Athens (Bradeen 1955). Each man born in that deme was a 
citizen of that deme. Other tha·n deme, there was an assembly which governed the 
demes. The impressive part of this period of C!eisthenes is that he obligated all 
citizens to participate in the Assembly. No law could pass without the Assembly's 
approval (Barber and Watson 1988). Hence it can be said that the rule by 
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hereditary king and the gifted tyrants was over. Democracy-kratos, or rule, of the 
demos, the people of the deme- was finally born. 
As it is seen above, even the birth of democracy originated from keeping 
freedom in the hands of the citizenry. Therefore, freedom can be linked with 
democracy. Rousseau once wrote ''Freedom is a food easy to eat but hard to 
digest" (quated in Baber and Dimon 201 3, 218). \/Vhether democracy comes 
suddenly by violence and revolution or slowly through an accretion of an institution 
that extends and protects liberty, achieving freedom, in other words consolidating 
democracy in the first instance may not be so difficult. Preserving, enhancing and 
securing it against its myriad and tireless adversaries are much harder (Jean­
Jacques Rousseau 1762). 
1 1  
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Contemporary Democracy 
Democracy must be more than a desire or disposition to be able to apply it. 
It depends in practice on a constitution and the institutional arrangements. It can 
vary a great deal from nation to nation and era to era. Democracy is not simply an 
ideal to be realized once and for all, or a project reproduced again and again 
around the world because governments are as mortal as people. After all, 
thousands of years since the Athenians disappeared from history, government had 
been experienced many forms of regimes. Yet, the Athenians handed down some 
fundamental factors for modern democracy: 
-Assembly democracy: citizens participated in assembly without 
representatives 
-Citizen Juries: justice became a responsibility of citizens by elections 
-The
.
appointment of citizens to politically based on a merit. (Blackwell 2003) 
These institutions take a place as crucial democratic devices in modern 
days like: representation, party governrr1ent and federalism (Kaiser 1 997). 
However, these devices cannot oper�te in a void. They need an environment 
which al lows people to feel safe and free. 
Modern democracy represents freedom and equality. Credible institutions, 
like the Freedo
'
m House, measure a
"
counfries' democracy based on their criteria. 
It is critical to keep in mind that democracy is not a destination·- it is a journey; a 
way in which people walk together; meanwhile they may traverse many different 




toward democracy typically follows a roadmap: First, the centralized power would 
be taken by elit�s. Then the desire for democracy, equality, and liberty takes power 
from those el ites and places it in t�e hands of the citiz�ns. Finally, the use of law 
to protect individuals from the abuse of that power-wh.ether it is in the hand of �lites 
or of the people at large. (Barber and Watson 1�88). 
Although .law and demo.cracy have not always existed in harmony, they . . 
were initially . integrated jnto each other in the systems. �ometimes, however, the . . . 
application of the law coincides with justice. In the creation of modern democracy, 
which means the victory of parliament over the king, the law served democracy by 
placing the function of legislation in the hands of the people's representatives 
(Waldron 2008). Besides, law maintained its essence, which is the law of nature 
which protected the rights of individuals to liberty and equality against every 
encroachment- whether from other individuals or from the state, even the 
democratic state (<;e9en 1 989). So, the tension between law as a protector of 
individu
.
als against the state and law as an instrument through which the state 
establishes community justice remains. Yet, as Rousseau mentioned that while we 
obey the iaw, we could be free only if we prescribe order for ourselves (Dent 2006). 
In the light of these thoughts, Americans attempted to create a balance 
between freedom and security to maintain both liberty and self-government and to 
govern themselves autonomously and lawfully.· Therefore, in the end they 
established � fede�al c�nstitutiori which assigned powers to a powerful central 
government but at the same time they ai
'
med to protect themselves from abuse by 
every tyranny, including the potential tyranny of democratic government. As 
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consequences of this aim, they .haq set lavi1fui restraints on government- dividing 
•' 
its power into three co-equal branches (executive, legislative and judicial) and 
establishing a legal wall around it, which they called the Bill of Rights (Lloyd 2013). 
This division can be accepted as a good definition of democracy. On the other 
hand, democracy does not mean that people can do whatever they want. While 
the power is given to the representatives, it is also protected by the judiciary for 
equality and freedom. Yet, the system was· not enough to persuade citizens to feel 
free. They also insist on selecting their states judges in a democratic way. It was 
the introduction of judicial review, which led the demand for term limits. Like 
Thomas Jefferson, many founders believed that this would bring the balance of 
power in favor of a judicial elitf:: (Frank 2012) . .  
If must be understood that being subjected to the law does not make 
democracy safeguarded because if the law in a democracy is just a codification of 
the will of the majority, then there is nothing that the law can do for freedom and 
equality. Nazi le.gislation is proof that applying the rule of law is not a democracy 
(Esgun 2018). Anything can be made legal by the legislative enactments of an 
elected parliament: the abrogation of freedom of opinion and expression, violation 
of the right to work, discrimination, expropriation, and even genocide. Nazi 
legislation was an unprecedented example of demolished liberties and social 
justices. John Dryden stated that, "Laws are vain, by which we right enjoy, if kings 
unquestioned can those laws destroy" (Dryden 2017, I. 763). The key words here 
. . . 
are right and efficiency, the contest is between a law that secures the rights of the 
individual and a law that enforces the community's common interest in legislating 
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on behalf of the public good, even at the cost of individual liberty. Thus, democracy 
can succeed, if law is subjected to democracy. 
Modern-day democracy pays attention to not only having a rule of law but 
. . 
also how close citizens are to making law through participation in legislation and 
elections for both representatives and another official administrates. Besides, the 
other subject of modern-day democracy concerns about maintaining universal 
human rights (Moravcsik 1 998). 
Even though countries claim that they are governed by democracies, 
claiming does not make countries truly democratic. Yet, on the one hand countries 
are sovereign, on the other hand declaration of human rights remind us how 
governments should protect their citizens' rights. Therefore, human rights are not 
only an aspiration to universal justice but also a guiding spirit for democratic 
countries. Providing human rights to the citizenry is essential because they are 
rights inherent to all human beings regardless of nationality, ethnicity, language, 
race, sex, or any other statues (Human Rights 2016). Even if a country does not 
describe itself as a democratic one, it is expected to ensure human rights. Having 
and maintaining human rights is not easily controllable. 
Even though democracy means citizens governing themselves, democratic 
regulations can be easily abolished. Therefore, citizens should stake a claim on :t 
and express their judgement in the public. The classical tendency about the 
meaning of democracy claims that the measurement of how many people vote, 
and how often they go to the ballot box is enough to acknowledge a country as a 
democratic one (Kennedy, Nagao. and Liu 2018; Kesselman 201 1) .  However, it 
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should not be forgotten that the voters merely vote and go home and leave the 
elected governors to govern. Yet, the active citizen, on the other hand, actually 
governs or participates in governing using institutions (Dahl 2005). In recent times, 
it is cleared that without p�riicipation, democracy may become corrupt and 
deteriorate into a fictious democracy then .to authoritarianism (Huntington 2012). 
The key definition of modern-day democra9y is whether a person has a vibrant 
. . . . . . 
sense of themselves as citizens- as a part of body politic rather than just as self-
interested individuals. If they are capable of expressing public judgment rather than 
just voicing their private needs and wants freely, it can be expressed that 
democracy makes itself presence felt (Axtmann 1 996). Therefore, pressure 
groups, local party organizations. and voluntary associations of the kind of 
participations aie essentials of the democracy to be an active citizen. 
As a result, the concept of modern-day democracy is inclusive of self-
governing, an active citizenry, and human rights and more. The prospective criteria 
for countries will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Prospective Criteria for Democratic Countries 
There is not a measurement that can help scholars assess the rate of 
democracy; however, it is clear that while some countries are democratic, others 
are not. The hardest part of the measurement of democracy is to determine a finer 
distinction. Besides, it is also difficult to distinguish whether countries within their 
new policies are prone to democratic or authoritarian governance. Therefore, 
. . 
under the leadership of Michael Coppedge, social scientists around the world, and 
credible institutions like Freedom House, Kellog Institute and the Economist 
16 
Intelligence have been working on the idea that there should be criteria to measure 
democracy (Democracy I Kellogg Institute For International Studies 2018; 
Democracy Index 2017; Freedom in the World 2018). Though there is still 
ambiguity surrounding the definition of democracy and the concept; thereby, same 
ambiguity for criteria too. So, institutions, which have been working on the progress 
of democracy over years have specifi� focus points to indicate democratic 
countries. 
Besides the vagueness of the definition of democracy, Human 
Developmer.t Report states that "The democracy a nation chooses to develop, 
depends on its history and circumstances" (Human Development Report 2002, 4). 
Thus, ·in this sense, democracy has a variety of different appearances. Besides, it 
is necessary to have common things that scholars can account for a country as a 
democratic one. In this concept it has to be specified at what the core traits of 
democracy are, ·and how they sho�ld appear. 
As stated above the credible i'nstitutions can come together at many points; 
however, multifariousness can be identified in their measurement criteria. Even 
though their discrepancy, it can be claimed that almost all of them are using the 
below main criteria: 
nature of eleCtoral proces��s (e.g. free e.lections),  functioning of government (e.g. 
. . -
checks and balances on government authority), political participation (e.g. voter 
turnout), democratic political culture (e.g. popular support for democracy) and civil 
liberties (e.g. a free press, independent judiciary) in a country (Democracy Index 
2017). 
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Past Present. and Future of Authoritarianism 
For most people democracy means government for by and of the people­
government by free and equal individuals. Yet, the liberty of individuals can fall 
prey to the equal_ity of individuals- mere voters vote anq go home and leave the 
�lected governors to govern. So, the rule of the major!ty �an become so cruel, so 
wro�_g ,  so oppressive to. individuals and to minorities, that it perverts demc:icracy 
itself, and t�e rule of the people �ecomes the tyranny of the mob. 
While the last several decades led to a mushrooming of studies focusing on 
democratic regimes, prominent studies examine authoritarian regimes. According 
to Geddes, Wright and Frantz, dictatorships govern more than 40% of the countries 
in the modern world (2014). In addition, Freedom House's 201 8 report 
demonstrates· that democracy has suffered 1 2  sequential years of decline 
(Freedom in the World 2018). Moreover, scholars claim that since the collapse of 
communism, the world has been shattered by three trends; "a democratic surge, 
a backlash and an authoritarian surge" (L. Diamond, Piattner, ·and Walker 2016). 
Hence, it is obvious that instead.of dying out, authoritarianism is on the rise. 
Before .analyzing the process of the authoritarianism, it is crucial to 
understand the meaning of the term. In the literature, 'authoritarian' has two 
different meanings. VVhile in comparative politics, it refers to a regime, which does 
not ·Offer free and fair .elections; in political psychology, authoritarianism. is related 
to the.psychological profile of people, which is "characterized by a desire for order 
and hierarchy and a fear of outsiders" (Feldman and Stenner 1 �97). According to 
Feldman and Stenner (1 997) governments' authoritarian personalities can be 
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. . :· . 
discussed based on countries' values and voting behavior. Besides, almost all 
authoritarian regimes hold elections, however those elections lack oversight and 
transparency. So, elections are no longer fundamental parts of democracies. 
When authoritarian governments hold an election, they are used as a tool by the 
government to prolong their rule: Moreover, leaders of those governments often 
promote elections as democratic values to conceal their realities (Kennedy, Nagao, 
and Liu 2018). · 
It is well known that different meanings come from different exhibition of 
authoritarianism because not only the definition of authoritarianism has chClnged 
in centuries but it also has been taken on different focal points than previous ones. 
In the. !ast century researchers not only focus on an authoritarian surge .but also 
new forms of authoritarianism because prospective �andidates of autocrats take 
advantage of their predecessors' and peers' experiences. Learning from their 
mistakes, they have been trying to increase the durability of their power qt the 
regime. at home
_ 
and from abroad. This has be�n <?alled "political technology" 
.(VVilson 2095) and the "authoritarian toolkit" (l. Diamond, Plattner, and Walker 
2016) or a "menu of manipulation" (Schedler 2002). While earlier authoritarianism 
studies mostly focused on how brutal authoritarian and totalitarian governments 
are, current studies lean towards their appearances. Therefore, studies display 
that the modern authoritarianism emerges like a democracy and is called a hybrid 
regime (Ezrow 201 8). 
Hybrid regimes sometimes are called "Competitive Authoritari'an Regimes" 
(l. Diamond, Plattner, arid Walker 2016) because while there is still competition 
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for elections between parties, the president has the power to erode the checks and 
balances system. Hence, the new type of studies on democracy and 
authoritarianism are more concerned with who holds power and how the power 
may impact the development and stability of the governments (Geddes 1999). 
Therefore, scholars argue that studies on authoritarianism in the 21st century 
concentrate not only on the function of governments within the light of quasi 
elections but also on the power of media, the sustainability of legitimacy, pluralism, 
kinds of elections, and reflection of all to the citizens and international order (Ezrow 
2018). Moreover, academics should be able to judge the 'authoritativeness' of 
governments not solely by how they came to power, or by the supposed 
personality traits of the electorate, but also by what they do once they are in power. 
The literature posits that rather than meaning and appearances, the 
classification of dictatorship can lead us to avoid making inaccurate assumptions 
. . 
of the path from democracy to authoritarianism (Conroy-Krutz and Frantz 2017). 
The classification can be divided into two categories: categorical and continuous 
(Ezrow and Frantz 2011 ) .  Categorial can be divided as civilian, monarchic and 
. . 
military; or personalist monarchic, dominant-party, and military (Cheibub, Gandhi, 
and Vreeland 201 O; Geddes 1999). By contrast, continuous classification 
considers authoritarianism as a continuum. In this system, such a country can be 
placed on a scale from fully democratic to fully authoritarian. Therefore, the 
concepts like competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002), hybrid 
regimes (L. J .  Diamond 2002), and electoral authoritarian (Schedler 2007) in this 
category. The second categorization also allows institutions to measure 
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democracy or authoritarianism (Freedom in the World 2018). In addition to 
measurement, using the second category, scholars can easily posit whether a 
country is moving towards democracy or authoritarianism (Conroy-Krutz and 
Frantz 2017). 
As stated above authoritarian regimes appeared in different ways and in 
different forms. The period of Nazi's government, which brought World War I I ,  was 
named as totalitarian regimes. Following World War II. a similar but different . . . 
domination of the idea of authoritarian governments emerged as the Single 
Dominant Party. Around the 70s and 80s,during the Cold War, military 
dictatorships came to the surface. Foilowing the end of the Cold War, globalization 
allowed democracy to spread easily; however, it changed the appearances of 
democracy (Kendail-Taylor and Frantz 2014). Today, even though countries have 
an option to elect their governance, a regime is
.
questionably called as democracy 
because citizens cannot enjoy the freedom of media, civic association, right to 
speak etc.(Gandhi and Lust 2009). 
Because authoritarianism would appear in different forms as in hybrid 
regimes, citizens of authoritarian regimes may perceive that they are governed by 
democratic regimes. In many modern types, authoritarian regimes adapt their rule 
to some aspects of democratic institutions. Thus, they shaped their regime with 
. : . 
democratic basics to impress the dtizens (Slater and Fenner 201 1 ). Since this 
shaping is successful, Ezrow claims that authoritarian governments are good at 
concealing their nature; therefore, they are more resilient than ever (2018). 
2 1  
The first common characteristic of quasi democratic countries is that they 
hold electiqns without democratizing. Padrigu and Ezrow call this type as "cosmetic 
democracy" (2018; Padrigu 2002). It means that whi!e strong governments apply 
their rules behiqd the scene, they provide elections to citizens. The second 
widespread choice of current authoritarian countries is tha_t the way of controlling 
the media. S_ome .authoritarian .regir:nes .fi gu�ed o.ut the importance of the media, 
which allows the government to control the flow of information. The main point of 
controlling media is that while previous authoritarian governments did not put 
limited pluralism on media, the r.ew ones pay lip service to independent media to 
control the adversaries in the sector (Heinrich and Pleines 2018). Quasi pluralism 
in every sector seems to promote civil l iberties, elections, freedoms; however, it 
more dangerously endangers the incomes of democracy. Ezrow posits that the 
recent systems are neither fully democratic nor autocratic (2018). 
As has been described, the �volution of authoritarianism makes thing.? 
harde�. As �iamor:id stated. in his article, hybrid regimes ar.e m9re. prevalentJhan 
ever (2002). Even though hybrid regimes clearly originated from flawed democratic 
regimes, they are more prone to authoritarian regimes (Mufti 2018). Mufti 
describes hybrid �egimes, which. has some democratic features, as authoritarian . . 
reg,imes (201 8). 
Even though measurement, progress or categorization of authoritarianism 
is not related to this article aim, they allow us to understand the possession of the 
two topic countries, Turkey and Venezuela. 
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Reasons for Authoritarianism 
As mentioned above, authoritarianism means that there are limited rights 
for the public; therefore, for people who have been shifting their countries 
government towards authoritarianism need reasons. To understand the reasons 
for moving towards authoritarianism necessitates describing the basics of 
authoritarianism. First, research shows that authoritarianism is correlated with 
. . 
conservatism, militarism, nationalism, and religiosity (Adorno 1982). According to 
William Eckhardt (Eckhardt 1991 ), Lentz's studies show that conservatives do not 
l!ke change in any way. A summary of his study shows that "The conservative 
[idelology] was more conventional, religious, moralistic, capitalistic, militaristic, 
nationalistic, admittedly racially prejudiced, and presumably sexist."(Eckhardt 
1991,  1 00). Eckhardt's unifying article on this subject shows that not only Lentz but 
also numerous scholars have researched this field and got similar results. 
Therefore, it can be noted that Eckhardt's demonstration on the essential elements 
of authoritarianism as conser\tatism, militarism, nationalism, and religiosity. It is 
necessary to take these dimensions into consideration. 
Secondly, candidate preference, party preference, national and foreign 
policy orientation and political behaviors are also important factors for 
authoritarianism. David J. Hanson examines these factors in his article (Hanson 
. . 
1975) as a variable in political science studies. Even though Eckhardt and former 
scholars have established links between conservatism and authorita
.
rianism, 
Hanson (1 975) believes there is more to au
.
thoritarianism than conservatism. 
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Hanson suggests that the socioeconomic status of the public, family traditions in 
.. -
countries, and social pressures also contribute to authoritarianism. 
Along with researching the democratization process and dimensions of 
democratic and autocratic regimes, scientists also study a country's stability. One 
of the scholars who studies the transition from authoritarianism to democracy is 
Myron Weiner. His research is a valuabie reference in ·the field. For example, 
Weiner (1 987) gathered practically every democratic theorist's ideas in his article 
to show the transition of countries to democracy. His main questions are "What 
coalitions against authoritarian rulers are most likely to succeed? Is popular 
support sufficient or is it also necessary to win over sections of the military and if 
so how is that to be done?" (Weiner 1 987, 861 ). He answers these questions by 
focusing on some countries which are still authoritarian. He also gives examples 
from countrfes which 
·
are in the transition pr
c
>cess. Despite this, many countries go 
back to the process of democratization. Weiner and authors like him have not 
realized this backward direction. To understand dernocracy, scholars are more 
inclined to a�aiyze countries, which ha·d transition from authoritarian to democratic 
regime; however, the opposite appmach can be helpful to understand the 
dimensions of the backward direction. 
While scholars have contributed to our understanding of the contemporary 
democracy a
·
nd authoritarianism, very little research specificaily focused on 
reasons of returning authoritarian regimes by comparing countries. Even though 
' . . 
countries are on their way to an authoritarian regime, they do follow different paths 
than each other. So far, scant resP.arch exists thatcomparesand contrasts the 
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reasons for authoritarianism in recent years. I explore the incentives of 
authoritarianism by comparing Venezuela and Turkey to see if my argument 
actually has merit. 
Turkey 
Past research indicates Muslims do not have any negative feeling about 
living under libereral-democratic principles (Peucker 2018). However, some 
scholars posit that Muslim countries are disadvantaged across all democracies 
. . 
and democratization process (Fish 2002). They argue that the concept and 
ideology of democracy is at odds with the values of Islam (Smock 2002). According 
to Steven M. Fish's hypothesis (2002), "Muslim countries are democratic 
underachievers" (p.4). As Turkey is a majority Muslim country, it should be 
analyzed in the light of this information. 
As has been discussed, many definitions and techniques of the 
measurement of democracy can be practiced. However, there is neither a specific 
definition nor limit to measure democracy in the world. Reliable institutions have at 
. . 
least a common criterion to measure for democracy. According to scholars who 
believe that Muslim countries cannot pursue democratic achievement, these 
criteria are
· 
an ·independent judiciary, economic development, free and fair 
elections, freedom for press, etc. In this regard, while a few scholars and 
philosophers, such as Montesquieu, Samuel H untington and Steven Fish, assume 
that Islam cannot comply with democracy, other scholars would dissent from the 
issue. One of the oldest political philosophers, Montesquieu, discussed Islam and 
democratization over a 250 years ago. Montesquieu claimed that while 
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Christianity presents its own justice, Islam only speaks with its sword (Secondat 
Charles de 1 748). Some scholars, like Samuel Huntington ( 1 996) have maintained 
Montesquieu's ideas about )slam and democracy. Fish (2002) has found out that 
Muslim countries are not good at the democratic process and their understanding 
of j_u.dicial system lacks the ability to democratize. With his empirical test, Fis� . . . 
argues that "Muslim countries are markedly more authoritarian than non-Muslim 
societies."(Fish 2002, 37). This research demonstrates that while some scholars 
claim the presence of conservatism creates negative effects on countries en route 
to democratization, other scholars believe that Muslim countries have barely any 
chance to continue their existence under a democratic regime. 
In terms of the alleged fact between democracy and Islam, Turkey may be 
the subject of the issue. International Religious Freedom Report 201 7 states that 
according to the Turkish government. 99% of the population of Turkey is Muslim 
(Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2017). Besides, data from 
. . 
KONDA's, one of the leading data collectors of Turkey, supports the international 
report. According to KONDA, 97.8% (KONDA 2009) of Turkish people define 
. . 
themselves as Muslim. However, this percentage does not represent how the 
country has been governed. Most of Muslim countries, though ,  either has been 
fully or partially governed by sharia2 (Hurriyet 2016; Johnson and Sergie 2014). 
While some of Muslims apply the sharia personal statues, like marriage, divorce 
and child custody, others apply the sharia both for personal status and criminal 
. . 
procedure (Otto 2008; Steiner 2002). However, Turkey is not one of them (Guercio 
2 Shari is known Islamic canonical law based on the teachings of the Koran and the traditions of 
the Prophet Mohammad. 
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201 ?a). Turkey is a democratic, secular, and social state. Thus, religion and 
government are two separate issues in Turkey. However, even though Islam is not 
a formal element of government, it is used by political parties to get support 
(Karakas 2007, 1 ) .  As a result, Turkey's political climate has been defined as a 
complex mixture since its foundation. Therefore, in order to understand Turkey's 
political climate, the relationship between Islam and democracy must be examined 
in terms of Turkey's position toward democracy. 
If so, what are the conditions for democracy in Turkey? To understand 
Turkey's political position today, consulting Turkey's history is essential (Guercio 
201 ?a). Turkey's political disturbance began after the Ottoman Empire collapsed 
and the Turkish Republic was founded. During the Ottoman Empire, society was 
governed by sharia like most of today's Muslim cour1tries. However, after the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic, the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk, introduced a new system to the Turkish people in 1928. This system was 
called secularism, which is known as laicism in Turkey (Cumhuriyet 2016). While 
sharia was used as the fundamental rule of law by the Ottoman Empire, laicism 
separates religion and the affairs of state. Laicisrn is a political system which 
excludes religious influences from the government. Not only does laicism 
. . 
discourage rellgfous involvement in governments but also forbids the government 
to· be involved in any religious activities. Thus, the system was unfamiliar to the 
people who had been governed by Islamic ieaders for almost 400
. 
years. Although 
almost 1 00 years passed since the foundation, secularism has been creating a 
political d isturbance. Conversly, scholars who focus on Turkey, democracy, and 
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democratization argue that laicism is fundamental for democracy and Turkey 
(Saglar 2016). Therefore, it can be claimed that the authoritarian approach in 
Turkey is deriv
_
ed from political d isturbance, i� o.ther words, the Turkish people do 
not und�rstand laicism in the proper cultural context. 
Venezuela 
Since t_he relationship betv�een economic development and 9emocr�tic 
improvement is seen a.s correlated, the relationship between these two factors 
must be considered in order to understand Venezuela's democratic position. 
Numerous political scientists claim that increasing economic power will lead 
countries into a more democratic position. In this case, we can say that capitalism 
promotes democracy and vice-a-versa. Scholars, who focus on the effect of the 
economy on democracy indicate strong evidence to support this theory (L. Rivera­
Batiz 2002). According to Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, democracy 
can improve in the highly capitalist governments because those governments have 
undergone dramatic industrialization, which brought bilateral relations between 
countries. Correspondingly, bilateral relations countries have to communicate with 
each other to trade, which entails mutually respected relations (Rueschemeyer, 
Stephens, and Stephens 1 992). in addition, outstanding scholars l!ke Lipset and 
Przeworski claim that economic development would also bring political freedom 
and democratic participation in governments (Lipset 1994; Przeworski 2004). On 
the other hand, authors like Neubauer and Jackman found that there is no causal 
relation between · economic development and democracy (Jackman 1 973; 
Neubauer 1967). In 
·
her research, Arat found that democracy is not affected by 
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economic development (Arat 1 988). Ulubasoglu and Doucouliagos assert that 
economic freedom and political stability relate to democracy whether d irectly or 
indirectly. Moreover, some scholars posit that an advanGed economy requires 
more political rights (Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi 2007). 
· Like Turkey, Venezuela has been subjected· to democratic consolidation. 
However, unlike Turkey, Venezuela has been put under the microscope because 
of its economic crisis. In  the 1950s; as the rest of Latin American countries were 
struggling with economic depression, Venezuela had the second fastest growing 
economy till 1980 (Desjardins 2017; Di John 2005). Yet, Venezuela has one of the 
largest proven oil reserves. it has been perceived as a broken country, though 
(OPEC : OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2017). Therefore, it has to be 
scrutinized




rds democracy from the pont of 
economic develop
.
ment and democracy relation. 
If so, what are the economic conditions for democracy in Venezuela? Since 
the colonial era, Venezuela has been a nation defined by its production of raw 
materials for export. Hence, the source of their wealth
. 
has been always described 
by Venezuelans as the production of raw materials. With the extraction of the first 
oil in 1914,  oil became the symbol of Venezuela's wealth and it still keeps its role 
(Coronil 1 997). Lombardi describes the value of oil for Venezuelans both as a 
curse and a blessing because as a colonized country, it has two dilemmas. First, 
it has been dependent on foreign oil companies. Second, Venezuelans do not 
know how to spend the wealth (Lombardi 1982). At the beginning of the '1 930's, 
the production of agriculture had decreased 1 8% of GDP and oil represented 70% 
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of all exports and by 1940, Venezuela became a net importer of food (Salas 2005). 
Since that time Venezuela's economic policies have been questioning because 
while high international ·on prices mean social and political stability, falling prices 
not only would affect the economy but also bring ·political instability. 
Even though
.
the research is limited· from 1989 to 201 0', it is important to 
remember the oil industry has been effective since 1 914. Even today, Venezuela's 
economy is derived from the· international oil trade (Desjardins 2017; Gackstetter 
Nichols and Morse 2010). Hence, the foundation of OPEC, the Punto Fijo period, 
the nationalization of oil reserves and the neoliberal economic politics before the 
90's are parts of today's political stance of Venezuela. 
When oil began to rain along Venezuela's border, people believed that this 
black rain would be an absolute end of the dependency on foreign powers. 
however. it was the beginning of the permanent dilemma. Venezuelan intellectual 
and historian Arturo Uslar Piteri stated "Venezuela would become an unproductive 
and idle nation. an immense petroleum parasite, swimming in a momentary and 
corrupting abundance propelled toward and imminent and inevitable catastrophe" 
(quoted in Coronil 1 997, 105) 
With a 25.2 economic freedom score, Venezuela is ranked 1 79th freest 
country in the world. This score is even worse than Cuba which is ranked 178th 
(The Heritage Foundation 2018). In 2017, GDP contracted 12%, inflation 
skyrocketed to 1 087.25% (See in Figure-4 below). At the end of the September 
201 8 consumer prices rose 488.86 percent. According to the IMF's estimation this 
rise could reach 1 000000% at the end of 2018 (Reuters 2018). 
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The economic instability in Venezuela also has been creating a political 
disturbance since the extraction of oil; however, the last issues almost lasted 
longstanding democracy which endures since 1958. Therefore, it can be claimed 
that the authoritarian approach in Venezuela is derived from economic instability. 
3 1  
Chapter 3: Hypothesis and Methodology 
Hypothesis 
Democracy and democratic consolidation have been questioned since the 
birth of democracy. There is still ambiguity whether democracy is the best system 
to govern countries or not. Yet, the key concept is that the authoritarian regimes 
do not offer exact freedom. However, while democracy research and discussions 
lose their value in the field, d iscussion on authoritarianism and its proliferation are 
on the rise. Therefore, the articles, news and popularity of authoritarianism lead to 
a discussion of the dimensions of authoritativeness. 
As Diamond stated in his book if "authoritarianism goes global" (L. Diamond, 
Plattner, and Walker 2016), the requisite is that to find out the fundamental 
structures of authoritarianism. Focusing on Turkey and Venezuela, the weight of 
recent evidence points toward the following hypothesis: 
H 1 : While authoritarianism in Venezuela is related to economic issues while 
authoritarianismin Turkey is related to politics. 
Research on democracy and authoritarianism tested the building blocks of 
these institutions; however, I believe that rather than testing abstract terms, 
testing the application of abstract terms would be more effective. Even though, 
the world is definitely increasingly authoritarian, there is an ambiguity whether 
reasons of all countries are same. Therefore, my hypothesis will provide not only 
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insight for the reasons of authoritarianism but also will enlighten the specific 
reasons of authoritarianism for the subject countries.Therefore, to understand 
why Turkey shifted from democracy to authoritarianism, I will compare it with 
Venezuela, which is in the same category and has a similar background. 
Data And Anaysis 
Turkey and Venezuela are countries that have a low level of transparency. 
Therefore, the most valuable data to understand their political stance may be 
newspapers, NGOs research, social media discussions and quantitative data 
which are taken from IMF, World Bank etc. Even though this research includes 
quantitative parts, it will mostly be based on a case study comparing the two 
countries political and economic progression. According to White "A lot can be 
learned from comparing two cases, especially when they differ in some interesting 
ways. The key issue is selecting two or more cases that are comparable in some 
interesting way-similar circumstances but different results, a success and a failure, 
contrasting circumstances" (White 1 999, 1 1 7). 
White's description of comparative case study guides my research, given 
well-documented differences in economy and political d isturbance, one of which 
failed and one of which achieved marvelous success. Besides, Keohane, Verba and 
King posit in their book "appropriately marshaling all the thick description and rich 
contextualization in a typical qualitative study to evaluate a specific theory or 
hypothesis can produce a very powerful research design" (King, Keohane, and 
Verba 2010, 122). Moreover, Yin (Yin 2003, xi) addresses that "Case study research 
is appropriate when investigators either desire or forced by circumstances a) to 
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define research topics broadly and not narrowly, b) to cover contextual or complex 
multivariate conditions and not just isolated variables, and c) to rely on multiple and 
not singular sources of evidence." All three statements are pertinent to my research. 
First, since the definition does not merely rely on democracy but also 
authoritarianism, the broad definition provides a deep understanding of the countries 
today's distance from democracy. Second, my research topic cannot be attributed 
to only one or two variables because focusing on just one-two variables can mislead 
me. Finally, since my sources are multiple, the case study should be the first method 
of my research. 
Revival of authoritarianism arises in the aforementioned countries after the 
201 Os. The d iscussion about authoritarianism in Venezuela arose with the reelection 
of Chavez in 2006, while the same discussion begun with a referendum which was 
held in 2010 in Turkey. It is obvious that, the beginning of the Chavez administration 
and the Erdogan administration will be the starting point of my research to clarify 
these discussions. In addition to this, the summaries of their history are in the 
literature review part. Therefore, as a time limitation, I will conduct my research for 
Venezuela from 2006 to 201 7 ,  for Turkey 201 0 to 2017. I will use the news reports 
notably from Hurriyet, Milliyet, Radikal (Turkish Newspaper), The Washington Post, 
New York Times, Guardian etc. Many books have been also written about the Hugo 
Chavez Administration and Recep Tayyip Erdogan administration, most notably: 
Venezuela (2010), Dragon in the Tropics (2015), Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the 
Decline of an "Exceptional Democracy"(2007), Chavez's Legacy (2014), Bad News 
From Venezuela (2018), Hugo Chavez and The Bolivarian Revolution: Populism and 
3 4  
Democracy in Globalized Age (2009), Turkey's July 15th Coup: What Happened and 
Why (20 1 7), Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey(2009), the Emergence of 
a New Turkey: Democracy and AK Party (2006), Why Turkey is authoritarian: from 
Ataturk to Erdogan (2018), The New Sultan: Erdogan and the crisis of modem 
Turkey (20 1 7).  By relying on such a massive array of book sources, I am able to 
gain valuable perspective toward countries. By analyzing the countries, I will be able 
to compare the countries progression. Hence, these collections of the books will 
form the foundation of my comparative case study. 
Also in this section of my thesis, I will apply my observations. The most 
important part of observation will come in view within analyzing the coup attempt in 
Turkey (2016) because I was an eyewitness to this attempt. The newspaper and 
other resources did not publish what I experienced on the streets in July 1 5th, 2016. 
My observation about the process and mechanism help me to understand the way 
that countries become authoritarian. Brady, Collier And Seawright mentioned "the 
strength of casual-process observation lies not in the breadth of coverage , but the 
depth of insight" (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2004, 24). 
Moreover, to reveal an inclination towards authoritarianism, the following 
indexes will be tested in findings: the nature of electoral processes (e.g. free 
elections), functioning of government (e.g. checks and balances on government 
authority), political participation (e.g. voter turnout), democratic political culture (e.g. 
popular support for democracy) and Civil liberties (e.g. a free press, independent 
judiciary) in a country. These indexes are gathered from Freedom House (Freedom 
in the World 2018) and the Democracy Index (Democracy Index 2017). As discussed 
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more than several times, there is no common ground for the measurement of 
democracy; however, the above criteria are the things that all institutions and 
countries can agree on those that are the fundamentals of democratic countries. 
While the largest portion of my research will rely on qualitative analysis, I will 
also test my hypothesis using graphs and charts. Using those data, I will gather a 
few indexes together to demonstrate Turkey's and Venezuela's economic progress. 
These statistical pieces of evidence will incorporate countries' GDP, inflation, 
economic freedom and democratic ranking. They will assist me in seeing the big 
picture of the research. Therefore, both the case study and statistical analysis 




From the 1 960s to 1 989 
Chapter 4: Findings 
"Venezuela had been promoted as a model of democracy for Latin America" 
(Ellner and Salas 2007, XIII); however, it is obvious that the Venezuelan 
government had become insufficient to respond to the needs of the general 
population in terms of politics and economy. So, while Venezuela was a 
democratic model, then what happened in Venezuela in one night to trigger this 
dramatic change? 
Like Barber and Watson mentioned, "Democracies are rarely destroyed 
from the outside" (Barber and Watson 1 988, 24). Hence, internal activities should 
be the reason of transition from democracy to authoritarianism. However, there is 
not a chance that the transition happened in one night neither in Venezuela nor in 
Turkey. Therefore, in order to understand the Venezuelan's today's regime, its 
history needs to be analyzed first. 
As is the case for all countries, the economy is a condition that empowers 
the governments or vice versa. Although poverty dominates the country since the 
colonial periods, Venezuela had ample natural resources that reduce the poverty. 
These exportable natural resources have been influenced Venezuela's economy 
and politics since the colonial period. 
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While cacao has the most important role in the colonial period, coffee took 
the cacao's role in the 1 9th century. Beginning with the 20th century, oil built the 
national economy forsaking agricultural and industrial economic diversity 
(Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010). The most important factor is that while 
coffee and cacao can be count as luxury goods, oil is a kind of necessity that is 
used for industry, transportation ,  and even for the food production. Even though 
export products vary, Venezuela's economic dependence to those products 
remains unchanged since colonial time. The unchanged economic dependence on 
export products means a national economic dependence on international pricing 
(Alvarez and Hanson 2009; Amaro 2018). Thus, higher oil prices paved the way 
for the good conditions for Venezuela's Economy. Besides, when the oil prices are 
high, which means the flow of money to Venezuela is high, Venezuelan Presidents 
took advantages investing oil revenues in social spending. In this point, the 
economic rise brought the stable politics to Venezuela. 
The oil defines the Venezuelan economy in the 20th and 21st century. 
Wealth meant to Venezuelans agricultural terms before oil; however, oil quickly 
became Venezuelan's present and future (Salas 2005). In 1935, while agriculture 
had fallen to 18% of GDP, the oil took 70% of all GDP (Coronil 1 997, 1 1 7-18). 
However, in earlier, Venezuela could not get enough profit from royalties of the oil 
extraction. Even though extractinng oil began in 1 9 1 7, the economic influence of 
oil came to play in 1 943 (Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 201 O; Wilpert 2003). 
During the Trienio3-Betancourt's administration, the oil ministry negotiations 
3 Trienio; Three years democratic period from 1945 to 1 948. 
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resulted in 50% profit sharing between-Shell, Gulf and Standard-and Venezuelan 
state (Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010,  55). Betancourt's main objective was 
the nationalization of the oi l  industry, the nationalization did not become a reality 
until 1976 (The New York Times 1 976). Betancourt and his party AD (Accion 
Democratica-Democratic Action) believed that Venezuela's economy and politics 
would become stabilized if Venezuela would trade its oil by itself. Romulo 
Betancourt, who is also known as the founding father of modern democratic 
Venezuela (Hecimovich 2017), began to advocate a democratic change in 
Venezuela since 1936. He also believed that Venezuela could be governed 
democratically over a more diverse economy by using oil resources (Hellinger 
1991 ). In a nutshell, Betancourt's government promoted democracy through the 
oil wealth and favorable relationships with the companies. Even though his first 
term in office was short, the most important democratic politicians and policies 
began in his term (Gackstetter N ichols and Morse 2010). 
Trienio did not last forever. Marcos Perez Jimenez began to rule the country 
as a first unelected military leader, then as president from 1 948 to 1 958. Perez 
believed that the good relationships between Venezuela and the North Atlantic 
could make Venezuela's economy better. Thus, cooperation between the 
companies and government were based on the illustration of U.S capital by 
Jimenez. He made concessions to the U.S. By 1 957, while the oil production was 
rising up, Venezuela simultaneously imported $695.4 million in consumer goods 
from the USA (Salas 2005, 1 58). By 1955, Venezuela earned $232 million from 
Carole alone, the leading oil company, and $7 billion totally from all the companies 
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between 1 948 and 1 957 (Salas 2005, 1 59). Although Venezuela sacrificed high 
profit in order to maintain good relations with the USA, the USA proceeded to 
explore new oil resources. While the new resources meant more profit to the USA, 
it meant risk for Venezuela's economy. The fluctuation of oil policies increased the 
instability in Venezuela. Besides, when Jimenez's regime ended, the government 
was in $1 billion recallable debt (Hellinger 1 99 1 ,  98). Moreover, the urban 
population boomed because Jimenez's administration spent the oil profits mostly 
on urban construction projects. The increased population in urban areas created 
urban middle classes. However, the gap between the rich and the poor got larger 
(Ewell 1 984). Most importantly the ranchitos4, which were started to be built on the 
Caracas valley during Jimenez's administration will be the building blocks for the 
Hugo Chavez's dictatorship. 
After the dark times, Jimenez's regime unchecked corruption which was the 
beginning of social inequality and political oppression, Venezuelan enjoyed the 
longest period of democracy between 1 959 and 1 989 which is called partidocracia 
(The New York Times 1 992). It cannot be claimed that it was a flawless democracy; 
however, it can be said that those were the longest stable years since 
independence (Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 201 O; lrazabal and Foley 2010). 
The period started with signing the Pact of Punto Fijo (Gomez Ramirez 2015; 
Gunson 2010). The parties, individualist groups, the military, and the churches 
realized that the lack of unity during the Trienio provided an opportunity to Perez 
Jimenez to seize the power. In order to secure democracy, therefore, parties 
4 Houses in which the poor people live and those houses were made from cement blocks. 
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including AD (Accion Democratica), COPEi (Comite de Participacion Electoral 
lndependiente-Social Christian Party) and URD (Union Republicana-Democratic 
Republican Union) admit to sharing the governance signing the Pact of Punto Fijo 
(Ewell 1984; Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010; Gomez Ramirez 20 1 5; 
Hellinger 1 991 ) . 
Because Jimenez administration was so busy filling their pocket through 
construction projects, the first partidocracia government inherited the largest 
budget deficit (Ewell 1 984). Therefore Betancourt, the first president of the period, 
increased lower international oil prices to close the budget deficit. Besides, he 
raised tariffs on imports product to encourage producing other industrial goods like 
steel and aluminum. By that time the USA, a close ally of Venezuela, declined 
Venezuela's request for sharing of global imports. Thus, one rejection paved the 
way for an international organization for countries that export petroleum. So, OPEC 
(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) was founded under the 
leadership of Venezuela (Coronil 1 997). During the foundation of OPEC, 
Venezuela's share of the global oil market was diminishing. While Venezuela was 
producing 38.4% of the world's crude oil in 1 955, this percentage became 24.3 in 
1 965. Consequently, the average price per barrel dropped from $2.65 to $1 .81 
between 1 957 and 1969. Venezuela could have rectified this mistake by increasing 
production to a high of 3,708,000 a day in 1 970. So, the percentage of oil 
representation became 66.4% of in 1967 (Hellinger 1991 ,  1 00). As a result, the 
establishment of the OPEC's aim was to control both the oil production and 
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FIGURE- 1 :  Total petroleum and other liquids production - Venezuela 
2015 
Source: Author's calculation based on data from U.S Energy Information 
Administration, Accessed November 25,2018 
Beginning with the USA's desire for another preferred supplier, the 
relationship between the USA and Venezuela was oscillating until the USA's 
decision to change its preferred oil supplier to Canada. Then Venezuela gave up 
playing with the USA; rather it strengthened its relations with OPEC. As a result, 
OPEC gained the right to set prices on international oil and established the fixed 
production level. When the Arab-Israeli Wars began, OPEC's power was at its 
peak. The price of crude oil for Venezuela exploded to $10.31 per barrel and the 
government's revenues reached 1 70%. These years were called the Golden Age 
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qf Oil (Hellinger 1991 ,  1 22-23). During the Golden age, the Perez administration 
increased government expenditures relying on high petroleum income. Between 
1 974 and 1 978, the public expenditures grew 96.9% and by 1978 only 10% of the 
people lived under poverty in Venezuela (The Global Economy n.d.). 
Consequently, while the current account balances had $8 billion surpluses in 1 97 4, 
it had a $6 billion deficit in 1 978 (Kazokoglu 2017). By 1 974, OPEC took one more 
step away from global oil prices regulation and moved toward nationalization of the 
oil reserves. Even though all politicians in Venezuela did not agree on the issue, 
the nationalization law was approved in 1 976. Perez thought that nationalization 
might be a solution to the huge deficit (Kazokoglu 201 7). 
The nationalization created PDVSA (Petroleos De Venezuela Sociedad 
Anonima-Petroleum of Venezuela). Nevertheless, PDVSA maintained a reliance 
on foreign technical expertise. Besides, the USA was still the primary buyer of the 
country's crude oil. Associated with nationalization, a commercialization 
agreement was signed between companies and Venezuela. According to the 
agreement, the oil companies were allowed to receive 88% of PDVSA's production 
proportional to their status prior to the nationalization. Therefore; the 
nationalization left a small percentage of profit share to Venezuela. Moreover, 
Venezuela had to increase its oil production level to raise its profit share. Thus, the 
nationalization made Venezuela dependent solely on oil production. As a result, 
the nationalization of oil prevented Venezuela from diversifying their economic 
resources (Hellinger 1 991 , 1 22-24). Despite all of these, the government 
continued to spend money unconcernedly on public expenditures. The 
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government pursued populist policies and invested its income in health care, 
nutrition, water supplies, and finally advanced rural housing. Moreover, the 
government emphasized the importance of education and invested money in 
public education. While the literacy rate had been 60.8% in 1 958, it rose to 89.8% 
in 1 990 (Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 1 5  and above) I Data n.d.). In 
addition, higher education became important and the government made an 
investment for it too. Even more, working-class Venezuelans enrolled in 
universities in the 1 980s. The percentage of university students who came from a 
working-class background was 36% in 1 991 (Reimers 1 991 ). Because of 
economic rise, according to political scientist and historians, Venezuela had 
experienced exceptionalism during the 20th century. That exceptionalism brought 
stabilized and healthy democracy; however, the direction of the democracy veered 
when the money stopped flowing (Ellner and Salas 2007, 8-13). Yet, there is one 
thing that should not be forgotten; even though social spending created the middle 
class, the gap between the poor and the rich grew too. 
In the 1970s government propped up public expenditures in education, 
health care, and social security. Moreover, the government subsidized the fuel and 
food industry. Therefore, people not only could buy stable foods, like milk and flour 
easily but also used the transportation anytime conveniently. So, the 1970s were 
known as the era of richness for Venezuelans. However, the oil boom did not last 
forever and when the calendar showed the 1980s, the international demand for oil 
was decreasing. So, the oil income was inadequate not only to satisfy the people's 
need but also in order to produce profits from the heavily capital-intensive oil 
44 
industry. Therefore, the government borrowed heavily from the World Bank, IMF, 
and foreign lenders like Citibank (Ellner and Salas 2007). While Venezuela's 
industries acquired 60% of their capital from credit, only 1 9% was from its own 
earnings (Hellinger 1 99 1 ,  146). Venezuela was in a difficult political position 
because it had to find a way to pay for loans while satisfying the people's need. 
For that reason, the government had to borrow more money with higher interest 
rates to pay old debts. Though the Campins's administration made a commitment 
to increase public expenditures to allay growing poverty 74% by 1983, the 
government began to devaluate Bolivar (1 983) and cut the public expenditures in 
health care and education (Rosati and Zerpa 2018). With climbing unemployment, 
the people could not send their children to schools. Therefore, the literacy rate was 
decreasing among the poor again. The increasing debt number skyrocketed from 
$9 billion to $24 billion during Campins administration (Coronil 1 997, 370). 
Moreover, in order to compensate for some social spending, the government 
reduced agricultural subsidies which increased food prices. The poor, who works 
with minimum wages could not afford to buy some staple foods (Ellner and Salas 
2007). 
On one hand, the growing economic crisis became more public in 1 989. 
The poorer grew poorer and the middle class disappeared; where the rich grew 
richer. Between 1 981 and 1997, the income share of the poorest 40% of the nation 
fell from 1 9 . 1 %  to 14.7%, while the income share of the wealthiest 1 0% of the 
nation increased from 21 .8% to 32.8% (Roberts 2003, 60). On the other hand, with 
the democratization Venezuela experienced its economic liberalization between 
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1 989 to 1 998. In the increasing division between classes, the people were hoping 
to see a bright future with next president Carlos Andres Perez, who became a hope 
for them (Marquez 2003, 200). He was re-elected to take Venezuelans back to the 
good times like he was the president in the 1 970s. Even though he was accused 
of corruption, Venezuelans were very reluctant to believe him. Besides, he was a 
charismatic leader who would claim international organizations like the IMF and 
World Bank as a reason of Venezuelan economic crisis. Once he called the IMF 
"a bomb that only kills people" (Coronil 1 997, 375). However, he made an 
agreement with IMF and accepted IMF's austerity program, which is called "El 
Paquete" behind closed doors. At that time, Venezuela owed $33 billion to 
international creditors (Coronil and Skurski 1991 ,  293). With the package, Perez 
reduced tariffs, began privatization in 64 public entries (Hellinger 1991 , 146), most 
importantly increased the price of the fuel by 30% (Roberts 2003). Moreover, these 
austerity reforms caused increased inflation and unemployment. In this regard, 
corruption and differences of distribution of income increased. 
Because of these factors, the public took the streets to protest Perez and 
his economic reforms. This protest, which is called Caracazo was a kind of riot 
against the government because the liberalization period not only affected 
Venezuela's economy but also created an uncertainty and a political tension. 
Thousands of people participated in the protest in Caracas and other major cities. 
The mi litary deployed during demonstrations to protect wealthy people from any 
predicament (Coronil 1997, 1 1 4). Further, the state described the people who 
were in the riots as drug dealers, thugs, and urban guerillas. The people, who were 
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masked (suspected to be the undercovered police officer) shot people escalating 
the general state of terror (Coronil and Skurski 2006, 1 1 7). In the end, according 
to official reports, 277 Venezuelans died; however, the suspected real number is 
1 ,000 people (Coronil and Skurski 2006, 85). 
By 1989, the Caracazo riots displayed that the system which was created 
in  1 959 was not working for the poor people. During the protest, writing on the 
walls identified that socioeconomic problems created political problems and the 
poor people which are the greater part of the population demanded solutions for 
them (Coronil and Skurski 2006, 1 1 0-1 1) .  The system was working until the 
decreased oil demand. It was absolutely obvious that corruption existed; 
nevertheless, power sharing between parties, investigating in health, and 
increased education gave hope to the people between 1 960s and 1 970s. Though 
the democratic system was impressive for all Venezuelans, since the end of the 
oil boom poverty significantly increased. Between 1984 and 1 989, the poverty rate 
increased from 46% to 62%. Moreover, the percentage of the population who lived 
in extreme poverty rose from 14% to 30% (Roberts 2003). 
The riot was the first strike for a democratic government. The second strike 
came with the coup attempt which was generated by Movimiento Revolucionario 
Boliviariano (MRS-Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement) group under the 
leadership of Lieutenant Hugo Chavez Frias and Francisco Arias Cardenas on 
February 4, 1 992. They portrayed themselves as a group which was against 
corruption and unjust distribution of power and money. However, the government 
overrided the attempt and jailed almost all of the plotters. Even though the coup 
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failed, Chavez and his friends would get support among the Venezuelan people. 
Further, the citizenry was happy to see that there was still a hope to be recovered 
economically and politically (Marquez 2003). As a result, the strikes beginning with 
Caracazo established a ground for new political landscape. 
By 1 993, Perez was impeached for corruption and adultery accusations. 
During that time, Rafael Caldera emerged as a leader who was opposed to the 
neoliberal economic policies. He even claimed that "it is difficult to ask people to 
burn for freedom and democracy while they think freedom and democracy are not 
able to feed them . . .  " (Hellinger 2003, 32). However, Venezuela still experienced 
neoliberal reforms until "the emergence of Hugo Chavez as a president in 1998" 
(John 2005, 1 1 1 ) and poverty continued to increase. 
Hugo Chavez and his team were free to run for the next election in 1 998. 
His campaign was spectacular. He based it on a Bolivarian doctrine5, is also known 
as Bolivarianism. and portrayed himself as a "man of the people" (Gackstetter 
Nichols and Morse 2010,  87). In his campaign, Chavez used election music which 
had anti-elite and anti-oligarchic rhetoric. (Di John 2005, 1 1 6). The citizens 
accepted him as one of them because he was not highly educated, and his parents 
were not one of the elites. Because he wanted to show that he was one of the 
lower classes, he used language like how the poor people use. Finally, he 
promised to change the constitution in favor of the poor citizens. Therefore, the 
people believed that Chavez was the leader who will bring whole change for 
Venezuela. In the end, Chavez won the election with 56% majority in 1998 (Left-
5 Bolivarianism is an idea against imperialism, inequality and co1TUption. It also describes the dream of 
United Latin American Countries (Tavukcu 2019). 
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wing populist Chavez wins Venezuelan presidency 1 998). So, Venezuela's journey 
towards authoritarianism had begun. 
Starting with the constitutional change, Chavez forever changed 
Venezuela's policies. When he was elected, changing the previous system was 
not difficult for him because the country was struggling economically. The GDP 
















FIGURE-2: GDP per capita growth between 1960-2014 
Source: Author's calculation based on data from Central Bank of Venezuela 
By 1 998, extreme poverty increased from 44.4% in 1 989 to 57.6% and the 
price of oil per barrel was the lowest (see in Figure-1 ) in decades-almost $8 dollar 
per barrel (Corrales and Penfold 2015, 18) .  Though he could have begun the 
changes with economic pol icies, he preferred to focus on rewriting the constitution 
looking for more presidential power. Thus, Chavez first active movement was to 
sign a decree which called for a referendum to change the constitution or to call 
the Constitution Assembly (Partlett 201 3). At that time, in order to change or reform 
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any article in the constitution, the two-thirds vote of the Congress was a 
requirement. However, there were not enough seats in the chamber or senate. So, 
he called for a consultative referendum. Even though the decree for a consultative 
referendum was challenged by his opponents, the court decided that it would be 
"bound to the spirit of the constitution in force, and therefore is limited by the 
fundamental principles of the democratic state of law" (Partlett 2013, para. 4 ). With 
the consultative referendum, Chavez bypassed the Congress to rewrite the 
constitution. As a result of the court's decision, the referendum was held in April 
1 999 and approved by over 87% of the national vote. Thus, Chavez got the power 
to hold the Constitution Assembly and he could elect delegates to the assembly 
(Corrales and Penfold 2015, 19;  Rohter 1999). Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
suspended the Congress because the court would not feel powerful enough to 
reject the wishes of the popularly elected president (Lansberg-Rodriguez 2016). 
Even though the judiciary fought for protecting checks and balances, they were too 
late. 
At the end of the election for the new constitutional assembly, Chavez's 
movement won 1 2 1  of the 1 3 1  seats. This triumph gave seats to Chavez's wife, 
brother, his former military colleagues and his former cabinet members (Rohter 
1 999, para. 1 0). Soon after the new Constituent Assembly approved the "national 
declaration of emergency" (Partlett 2013, para. 6). By the emergency declaration, 
the assembly dismissed many judges who had been accused of corruption, with 
their replacements being more supportive of the Chavez administration. (Partlett 
2013). With the majority, it was not hard to draft the new constitution, which is 
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called the Bolivarian constitution. According to the new constitution, the president 
would have more power than the other branches of government and the traditional 
parties. The presidential term expanded from 5 years to 6 years, reelection was 
enabled, and the president alone could give promotions without legislative 
approval. Because the Senate was eliminated, the checks and balances were lost. 
Moreover, the president achieved limitless power to call a referendum. As it is 
seen, the new constitution was designed way far from political reconciliation and 
democratization (Brewer-Carias 201 0). After the long period of democratic 
government, the first act of Chavez developed suspicion about the fairness of 
official institutions (Karl 1 987). 
After ratifying the new constitution, Chavez was capable of being reelected. 
He desired to clean not only national level seats but also state level seats under 
his leadership. Therefore, he called for a mega-election in July 2001. Chavez and 
his party acquired 59% vote for the presidency and 60% seats for the National 
Assembly (Corrales and Penfold 2015). By that time, the most important factor was 
his election rhetoric. While he was still mentioning the solutions for poverty and 
class divisions, his rhetoric of opposition parties had racist undertones (Gackstetter 
Nichols and Morse 201 0). After the mega election, the Chavez administration 
introduced a project, Plan Bolivar 200. The project aimed to solve social problems, 
like sanitation, health care, housing, and transportation. Within Plan Bolivar, social 
spending on education increased by 4.3% between 1 998 and 2001 (Ellner and 
Salas 2007). Although the project was effective in the short-term, it was terminated 
by coup attempt which is held in 2002. After the coup attempt, Chavez tendered 
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his resignation from the presidency. Since he resigned, all his plans, including Plan 
Bolivar, were reversed to pre-Chavez period by the interim president, Pedro 
Carmona. 
Chavez aimed to cooperate with all countries which were developing 
nations. However, he refused to be a provider of raw materials. He even 
questioned trade agreements with NAFTA. His policies were called independent 
foreign policy which was the exact opposite of the previous democratic government 
since 1959. His stance towards the US, the international economic institution like 
IMF, and World Bank strengthened his support among the poor. 
At the end of 1 999, when Chavez was elected president of Venezuela, its 
political ratings in Freedom House worsened from 2 to 4, its civil l iberties from 3 to 
4, and its status changed from Free to Partly Free. The given ratings were 
understandable when Chavez was examined for what he did. He dismantled 
checks and balances, dominated the constituent assembly, ratified a new 
constitution, made it possible to stay in power until 2013, and finally dismissed the 
Congress and the Supreme Court. Therefore, even though the regional and 
presidential elections were held freely and fairly, those circumstances made 
Venezuela from a free country to a partly free country (Freedom House 1999). 
The most important factor in controlling power by Chavez occurred in 
December 2001 . When Chavez was elected, he wanted to revitalize the economy 
without foreign institutions' aid. For his desire and his new programs, he increased 
the revenues which came from oil. Thanks to the new legislation system, Chavez 
had authority to direct oil policy. He, therefore, assigned to PDVSA a new 
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president, Ali Rodriguez who was a sympathizer of Chavez. Ali Rodriguez also 
appointed many new board members who were sympathizer of Chavez too 
(Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010). While some people appreciated that the 
PDVSA would have more closely controlled the PDVSA, others questioned the 
qualification of the new management board members. The opposition parties took 
advantages of PDVSA's current position and they called for an indefinite general 
strike (See in Figure-3). The managers who were working in the PDVSA but not 
the sympathizer of Chavez began the strike. Not only did PDVSA shut down the 
industry, but also other companies did. Businessmen in the elite and middle 
classes organized in favor of opposition against the Chavez administration 
(Thompson 2003). The members of the opposition owned all the major media, 
except state-owned radio and television. They used the media to organize the 
protest for the strike. Using the media power proved that the populism was not 
fundamental for Chavez's dictatorship; rather he used the economic conditions to 
take under control of the nation. The strikes that happened in 2002 and 2003 
served his purposes. In the protest, two groups- the poor and the elite met, and 
violence erupted. The chaos allowed military to detain Chavez on April 1 1 ,  2002 
(An Opposition Gagged 2007). Although the majority of the population, the poor, 
turned against the military demanding the releasing of the president, their protest 
was not sufficient to bring back Chavez. One night later, the FEDECAMARAS 
leader Pedro Carmona was accepted as the president (Forero 2002) Even though 
the USA recognized his presidency, the international pressures and some armed 
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forces who were unwilling to support anti-democratic presidency forced Carmona 
to resign. As a result, Chavez returned to the presidency. 
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The opposition, however, were determined to take Chavez's presidency. 
They called the second strike in December 2002. This strike lasted more than the 
first attempt - two months. Therefore, oil and gas production almost stopped. 
PDVSA and other oil companies produced 40,000 barrels oil in a day rather than 
producing 3.2 million barrels (The Economist 2003, para. 2). Therefore, the 
revenues from oil decreased and food shortages began. In January 2003, the 
economic data showed that Venezuela's economy lost $50 million a day 
(Thompson 2003). Moreover, the production equipment damages cost around $3 
billion (Camacho 2005, paras. 6-7). During the strike, some PDVSA employees 
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lost their jobs. Thus, people realized that they were going to lose whatever they 
had economically if they had another strike. 
After a while, businessmen were forced to close their businesses. Once 
Chavez realized the situation, he reopened the oil companies using military power. 
The citizens were happy because the production of oil increased to 2 million barrels 
a day (Ellner 2003). In total, the country lost $12.8 billion during the strike 
(Camacho 2005). Since the nation suffered from the strike, the people believed 
that the oppositions were not willing to empower the country, rather they were 
destructive. Further, Chavez's rhetoric during the strike brought advantages to him. 
During the strike, Chavez claimed that the oil was the legacy of the nation, PDVSA 
should not govern the oil economy without government control. As a result, at the 
end of the strike, Chavez subjugated the PDVSA and hired all employees who 
were loyal to him. Getting control of the PDVSA meant controlling the oil income 
for Chavez. Chavez used the PDVSA's revenues for social spending. In 2007, 
PDVSA spent $14.4 billion for social expenditures like education and healthcare 
(Alvarez and Hanson 2009). Corrales (2006) claims that Chavez updated 
authoritarianism controlling PDVSA's revenues. In other words, Venezuela's 
authoritarianism began with becoming an oil-based country (Egilmez 2017). 
In 2004, Chavez won one more victory against the opposition taking 
advantages of his economic aid to the poor. The opposition collected more than 
enough signatures- 3.4 million in December 2003- to recall for a presidential 
referendum (Corrales 2006). Nevertheless, though the opposition collected 
enough votes-3.7 million votes "YES" to reelect the president, "NO" votes 
55 
outnumbered the "YES" votes by 5.8 mil lion (Carter Center 2005). Many analysts 
and researchers including Sujatha Fernandes claimed that Chavez held power 
because the poor loved him. Moreover, Fernandes (2007) posits that Chavez's 
subsidized social programs were a decisive factor for his victory in 2004 (Corrales 
2006; Fernandes 2007). According to Freedom House 2005 report, the 2004 
victory directed Chavez to increase "his influence over the judicial system, media, 
and other institutions of the society" (Freedom House 2005). High oil prices in 2004 
allowed Chavez to increase social expenditures which were the highest in Latin 
America in 2006. While 8.2% of the GPO was social spending in 1998, Chavez 
increased this number from 8.2% to 21 .9% of GDP by 2006 (Weisbort and 
Sandoval 2007).After 2004, Chavez aimed to change all economic policies related 
to oil. If the foreign oil companies would like to maintain trade in Venezuela, they 
had to give 60% share to the state. Further, PDVSA's employees were chosen by 
him (Ellner 2003). 
In 2006, Chavez won the election with 63% of the vote while the turnout 
rate was 75% (Al Jezeera Turk 2013). From time to time, Chavez claimed that the 
nationalization of other oil companies along with PDVSA would increase the 
government's profit from 40% to 60% (Alvarez and Hanson 2009). After the 
election, in 2007, relying on the increased number of share and his voting rate, 
Chavez wanted one more reform on the constitution. The draft of this reform 
included the indefinite elections for president, the presidential appointment of 
states governors, and declining unlimited states of emergency; however, for the 
first time since 1 999 Chavez could not win the election (see in Figure-5). Despite 
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his first defeat, Chavez's program on social spending with good oil prices made 
him irreplaceable in the eyes of the poor (Hellinger 2003). His social spending 
proved his promises towards the poor. Offering the unreachable social programs, 
Chavez was able to manipulate the poor. Though the people and Chavez gained 
benefit from the social expenditure program, they were not in the best interest of 
the nation (The Economist 2006). 
Moreover, the state turned its neoliberal economic policies to socialist 
policies in 2006. As a result of the change, the government nationalized not only 
the oil companies but also phone company-CANN in 2006 and Steel Company­
SIDOR in 2009. Further, Chavez's named his economic policies "Socialism in the 
Twenty-First Century". He guided the monetary and banking policies regarding to 
socialist policies. When crude prices were $100 per barrel, neither economic nor 
political problems came to the surface. Since oil prices were high, the VEB (the 
official currency of Venezuela) was valuable. While using the valuable VEB on 
social spending was easier, it made Venezuela import-based economy (Egilmez 
2017). 
After the general strike, Chavez promulgated a new series of social 
packages called misiones for the poor. These social reforms were Chavez's 
fundamentals. There were 27 missions which provided healthcare, education, 
scholarships, and food funding. By 2007, funding for the missions in total 
accounted for 3.5% of Venezuela's GDP which may be the largest social spending 
program in Latin American history (Corrales and Penfold 2007). Although 
programs are successful, they were not sustainable because they were dependent 
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on oil prices around the world. As it is seen in Figure-1 ,  the country experienced 
incredible oil production in its history during the Chavez administration. That rise 
in oil production explains how Chavez used oil revenue until 2008. As a 
consequence of economic crisis in 2008, social expenditures had been cut. The 
administration tightened economic policies, exchange and interest rate. Strict 
controls on economic policies caused for food shortages and economic slowdown. 
The inflation rate doubled (see in Figure-4). Today, the economists predict that by 
the end of the year Venezuelan inflation can hit one million percent (Amaro 201 8). 
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The opponents of Chavez won the referendum with slight vote difference in 
2007. Chavez was determined to pass the new legislation and he proposed the 
referendum package one more time in 2009. Despite his declining approval rate, 
he won the referendum in 2009 (See in Figure-5). As a result of the referendum, 
Chavez would stay forever in the presidency. Unlike the referendum held in 2007, 
where Chavez just tried to remove the term limit for the presidency, in 2009 he 
widened the referendum package referring that not only the president but also 
mayors and governors would not be term limited. Therefore, he received 54.85% 
of constituent approval (Venezuela'daki Referandumda Chavez Zaferi 2009). This 
change decreased Venezuelan Political rights score from 4 to 5 in Freedom House 
(Venezuela 201 O Scores 2010). 
Voting Rates of Chavez 
1998 p 2000 RE 2006 p 2009 R 2010 PE 2012 p 
FIGURE-5: Voting rates of Chavez 
P: Presidential Elections, RE: Reelection, R :  Referendum, PE: Parliamentary 
Elections 
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Source: Author's calculation based on Newspaper official statements for 
Venezuela's election 
After getting all power in his hands, Chavez could not control the economic 
problems. Since he cut the social expenditures, the food shortages exacerbated 
the problems. The citizens not only had food problems but also suffered from 
electricity and water shortages. In short, people could not meet their basic needs. 
As a result of the circumstances, Chavez's party lost its majority in 2010 
parliamentary elections. That means he would not be able to leg is late whatever he 
desired. It is clear that whenever Chavez could not affort buying people's votes 
through social expenditures, he lost his popularity. Yet, the citizens did not 
abandon him totally because they were in faith that Chavez was ceased by 
external forces (Hugo Chavez ve Venezuela se9imleri Ozerine 2012). His 
announcement about his illness softened opposition. When he declared his 
candidacy for the next election, the people supported him (Carroll and Lopez 
2012). Consequently, he received 55. 1 %  of votes. He was supposed to take an 
oath in January 2013; however, his cancer relapsed. Though the inauguration 
ceremony postponed, he could not take an oath. He died on March 2013 at the 
age of 58. 
Even though this analysis is to the Chavez administration, it is important to 
indicate that Chavez passed on all his authoritarian policies to his successor. 
When Chavez declared Nicolas Maduro as his successor, it was obvious that he 
was willing to make the country more authoritarian. Therefore, Nicolas Maduro 
took over the government temporarily. He was elected as president in April 2013. 
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When Maduro came into power, he devalued Venezuela's currency. This situation 
increased the price of staple goods (Caracas 2013). In 2014, a huge economic 
decline took place in Venezuela. Venezuela had the world's highest inflation rate 
in 201 5  (Flannery 2015). The economic problems also increased the rate of crime 
and corruption. Venezuela encountered popular protests across the country, and 
the hundreds of protesters were killed in those protests between 2015 to 2017 
(Turkce 2017). As a result of the changes, the Freedom House ranked Venezuela 
as a "Not Free" country in 201 7  (Freedom House 2017) because Chavez made 
easier for Maduro to take everything under control. 
According to Freedom House, Venezuela's democratic institutions began to 
deteriorate since 1 999 when Chavez was elected for the first time as president. 
Maduro desired to expande took it one step further by expanding all rights granted 
to the president in the new constitution. The Supreme Tribunal Justice annulled 
the National Assembly in 20 17 .  Even though the decision was reversed, Maduro 
superseded the National Assembly with a National Constituent Assembly whose 
members were chosen despite the opposition boycott. Many political adversaries 
were prisoned. The number of imprisoned exceeded 600. Finally, there is not a 
thing that can be related to human rights or democracy. Today, Venezuela is a 
place where its citizens eat rotten meat (BBC News 2018). 
Turkey 
The Turkish Republic was founded in 1 923 after the collapse of Ottoman 
Empire. As a unique country, Turkey incorporates European and Middle Eastern 
cultures together. The complexity of those cultures has been one of the major 
6 1  
issues in Turkey since its foundation. Another issue is nationalism. Nationalism 
and religion became the corner stones of the new republic (Karakas 2007). These 
religious-national identities of Turkey originate from Kemalism. Kemalism is a kind 
of ideology that its followers believe Ataturk's main ideas and his practices should 
shape the Republic of Turkey (Hanioglu 2012). In this regard, the Turkish 
Constitution describes Turkey as democratic, secular and loyal to the nationalism 
of Ataturk (TBMM 1982). These corner stones paved the way for the current 
president Recep Tayyip Erdogan to become authoritarian. 
The founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is known as the builder 
of the division between piety and non-piety citizens in Turkey. Since he removed 
religion from politics accepting a laic regime in 1 928, Ataturk's supporters believe 
that he shifted Turkey to more modern world, where his adversaries contend that 
he disenfranchised Turkish by taking away their freedom of religion (Oztig 201 8). 
Since the foundation of the republic, laicism determined to modernize the Turkish 
people; however, rather than performing its real objective, laicism caused higher 
polarization between conservative-religious and Kemalist-secular (Hale and 
Ozbudun 2011  ). Ataturk dictated a single party regime to apply a secular regime 
in the future. Thus, he adopted new secular laws. He closed the religious schools­
medrese and religious courts-kad1/1k milessesesi, adopted the Gregorian 
calendar, changed the Ottoman alphabet to the Latin alphabet, made Sundays as 
a holiday instead of Friday which is a holy day for Muslims and the Ezan, which is 
Islamic call to worship was made Turkish rather than Arabic for a short time, but it 
has begun to be recalled in Arabic later. Moreover, he believed in modernized 
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institutions. Therefore, he replaced Islamic laws with western style-civil laws (ATA 
TSK n.d.) .  The Turkish people acknowledged almost all changes except the 
change of the dress code which is related to the headscarf and Turkish Ezan. 
Since the Ataturk administration's ruling elite was formed by political 
bureaucrats, military actors and civil servants and they were secularist while the 
conservatives were excluded from the administration. (Hale and Ozbudun 201 1) .  
In addition, since Turkey experienced many mil itary coups to protect laicism, the 
Turkish military became the advocator and protector of Kemalist ideas (Selc;uk 
2016). Until 2013, the headscarf ban stayed active. Therefore, it had caused 
political turmoil. Solving the headscarf problem paved the way for the dictatorship 
of Erdogan (Hakan 2013). 
Secularism is a kind of Western ideology which allows people to escape 
from religious pressure (Hallward 2008). Even though aim of secularism was to 
organize the relationship between religion, politics and society, the different kinds 
of interpretation occurred in societies (J. Butler et al. 201 1 ). Moderate secularism 
is interpreted freedom of religious expression, and it also allows the separation of 
religion and politics (Ertit 2014; Lovell 2009). However, the laic version of 
secularism was never interpreted as freedom of religion until 2013 in Turkey. On 
the contrary, laicism accepted that the display of any religious emblem is forbidden. 
As a result, beginning with the leadership of Ataturk, subsequent military leaders 
felt as a guardian of laicism accepted the extreme interpretation of secularism. 
Since secularism is interpreted with an iron fist, it was not only effective in the 
military, but also was effective in schools, universities and public offices in Turkey. 
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The public face of Ataturk principle's became headscarf ban. The ban also divided 
society between religious and secular. 
After a long single party regime, Turkey politics was transferred into a two­
party democracy in 1 950 (Musil 2015). The DP (Democrat Party), which was 
center-right party won the election held in May 1950. Because of their political 
stance, they showed concern about freedom of religion. The party criticized the 
interpretation of secularism and emphasized the importance of Islam for Turkish 
culture. Thus, they reopened the Imam Hatip high school, which were schools of 
theology, based on Islamic discipline (Karaman 201 5). However, a Junta 
administration took the government under their control in 1 960 pretending 
application and legislation of the new laws were against the Ataturk's principles, 
so against secularism (Alkan 2016). The administration returned to civil authority 
in 1 961 with the elections. Moreover, a new constitution, which is known as the 
most liberal constitution ever in Turkey, was written. The new constitution 
transformed the two-party system in multi-party system (Karpat 1 970; Ozbudun 
1 996). Even though the new constitution was the most libertarian one, secularism 
kept its position. The military coup gave the memorandum for resignation of the 
old government in 1 97 1 .  The following government was not able to produce 
political stabilization. As a result, a military coup occurred one more time in 
September 12, 1980 ( 12  EylUI darbesinin oncesi ve sonrasmda ya�ananlar 2015). 
After the coup, a new constitution was established. The new constitution 
took out the libertarian part of the 1 961 constitution and strengthened the 
presidency of the republic. With the 1980 coup, the headscarf ban became more 
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strict. Junta leader Kenan Evren began a headscarf ban in universities using the 
Iranian revolution as a reason. He even stated that "if showing the women's hair is 
sin, God would create them bald." (Hakan 2013; Kenan Evren'den torbana ilgin9 
91k1� 2008). However, conservative people, especially women, were not pleased 
with the change. When the military regime ended center-right liberal party ANAP 
(Motherland Party) came to the power under the leadership ofTurgut Ozal. Without 
analyzing Turgut Ozal administration, it cannot be understood how Erdogan has 
been changing Turkey towards democracy to authoritarianism. Turgut Ozal is 
known for his liberal economic policies because his neoliberal policies completely 
created new political identities. Conservative-religious groups became stronger 
and got a voice to raise both in politics and in industry (Yavuz 2009). Ozal was 
the ffrst prime minister, who disagreed with extreme Kemalism, which means 
extreme secularism and nationalism (Ataman 2000). In his term, Ozal consolidated 
a relationship not only with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) but also 
with the European Union (EU) (Ataman 2000). Some posited that what Ozal did 
was an incomprehensable dilemma. However, advanced relations with the OIC 
and the EU decreased the one-way dependence relations among Turkey, EU, the 
USA and Middle East (Ataman 1 999). While he modernized Turkey based on EU 
provisions, he increased the visibility of Muslimism. One time, he even indicated 
that "I am not going the quit Namaz6 because I am the president" (<;ok ozel 
fotograflarla Turgut Ozal 2013). When he was a prime minister, legislation was 
passed to liberalize the headscarf in universities in 1988. However, the president 
6 Worship that has to be done in five times a day for Sunni denomination of Islam. 
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of the period, Kenan Evren vetoed the bill claiming that it was against laicisim 
(Turban tart1§malari 60'1arda ba§lam1§t1 2010). As a result, Ozal became the 
advocator of the conservative-religious people and he began to pave the way to 
today's politics. 
After Ozal's death, Islamic-rooted parties was on the rise. From 1993 to 
1996, the right-center parties formed the government. In 1996, the Refah Parli$i 
(Welfare Party-RP) lslamist political party came to the fore under the leadership of 
Necmettin Erbakan, who is known for his Islamic agenda. Deputies of RP made 
statements regarding the importance of Islam and Sharia. One of the deputies, 
Ibrahim Hali! Celik stated that " I  will fight to death to introduce sharia. Therefore, 
being a member of RP's is the only way to be a good Muslim because this party is 
the Islamic jihad army". Another member of the party, Hasan Huseyin Ceylan said 
that "the country is our country; however; the regime is not ours. The regime and 
Kemalism is others." (Refah'1 yakan 7'1i 1 998). Because of all these statements 
and the party's manner, the National Security Council gave to the party a 
memorandum to change their manner on February 28, 1997 (28 $ubat post­
modern darbesine giden sOre9 2016). After the memorandum, prime minister 
Erbakan resigned without a military coup; nevertheless, this memorandum is called 
a post-modern coup in Turkish politics (Milliyet 201 8). 
Following the February 28 provisions, the Council of Higher Education 
strengthened the dress code in universities. Students who did not take 
headscarves off before entering the university buildings were expelled from the 
universities. Moreover, the university presidents who did not strictly apply the 
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headscarf rules were dismissed (Tahaoglu 2013). Once again Islamic based 
lmam-Hatip secondary schools were closed. In early 1 998, the RP was banned 
from the politics. Today's president Recep Tayyip Erdogan was a member of the 
RP. He was even elected as a Mayor of Istanbul between 1 994 to 1 998 from that 
party. Also, the former president Abdullah Gui was a deputy leader of the party. 
The RP's successor was Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party-FP) won seats at the 
parliament. One of its deputies Merve Kavakci, who was wearing the headscarf, 
was elected as a parliamentarian; nevertheless, she was not allowed to make an 
oath by the prime minister of the period (Kinzer 1999b, 1 999a). The prime minister, 
Bulent Ecevit indicated that: 
"No one interested in any women's dress style in their private 
life; however, here is not a place where anyone can live their 
private life. This is the supreme institution of the country. 
Anyone who hold an office at the parliament has to obey the 
state's laws. This is not a place that can be dared to fight with 
the constitution. Please bring her into the line."(Utan9 
goruntoleri 1 999). 
After all, the president Suleyman Demirel also indicated that Merve Kavakci 
is a threat to the laic and the powerful Republic of Turkey (Kinzer 1999b). As a 
result of the incident, the FP was banned from the politics with the constitutional 
court's decision in 2001 (Hurriyet 2001 ). 
By the middle of 2001 a new party, Ada/et ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and 
Development Party-AKP) was founded under the leadership of Recep Tayyip 
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Erdogan and Abdullah Gui. As a 1 5-month old party, AKP won the next election 
with 34.63% of the vote. Because Erdogan recited a poem which has verses with 
Islamic essence during his mayorship, he was banned from the politics and 
imprisoned for 4 months. Therefore, even though AKP had a higher voting rate, 
Erdogan could not be the prime minister at that time. With AKP's outstanding effort 
and with the help of the main opposition party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-Republican 
People's Party}, the parliament made an amendment in the constitution and 
annulled Erdogan's ban from the politics. Thus, in 2003 Turkish parliament held a 
by-election in a city which is called Siirt, and Erdogan became a prime minister 
winning that by-election (Yavuz 2009). This was the first enthusiastic political tactic 
of Erdogan. 
Even though the party adopted more secular attitude when it is compared 
its predecessors, it was sure that the part desire to lift the ban of headscarf in 
universities. Almost all of the party leaders' wives were wearing headscarf. During 
the 29th of October Republican Day Reception, the president Ahmet Necdet Sezer 
who is extremely secularist did not allow the leaders' scarf-wearing wives entrance 
to the presidential palace. Moreover, the commander of the Turkish armed forces 
Hilmi Ozkok gave Sezer full support (Yilmaz, Babacan, and Saydamer 2003). 
Despite the all of the oppositions, the AKP stayed calm and maintained its 
democratic stance. 
In 2007, before the general elections, there was a presidential election in 
April 27, 2007. The AKP announced that their candidate would be Abdullah Gui 
whose wife was wearing a headscarf. Because of that issue, on the same day, the 
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military announced an e-memorandum in their website. The Council of Ministers 
gave a response to the military indicating that "the unity and integrity of our country, 
the notability of our nation and the qualifications of Turkey as a secular, democratic 
and social State of law. Turkey's national unity and integrity and the welfare of the 
Turkish Nation is possible with the protection of those values. It is not possible to 
approve any behaviors and acts that are revealed from time to time by real and 
legal persons against the basic qualifications of our Republic, the Constitution as 
well as the laws" (Ural 2012, 731) .  In the same year, the new president of the state 
appointed a new president to the Council of Higher Education. With this change, 
wearing a headscarf was liberated virtually. 
Since the citizens did not want the military intervention anymore, the e-
memorandum caused the increased vote rating in  the next elections in July 2007. 
The AKP received 47% of the vote. The party took more seats than before in the 
parliament. Therefore, Abdullah Gui became a president on 29th August 2007. 
However, the E-memorandum7 stayed the military's web site until August 2012 
(BugOn 27 Nisan e-muhtirasmm y1I  donOmu 2018). 
The increase in voter turnout and Abdullah Gui's presidency strengthened 
the AKP's position not only in the parliament but also in the eyes of the public. 
Thus, the party proposed an amendment to change the headscarf ban in 
universities in 2008. The Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (The Nationalist Movement 
7 E-memorandum: Turkish General Staff released a statement on the military's website after the 
presidential election in 2007. In the statement, the General Staff indicated that elected president whose wife 
wears the Islamic headscarf is a threat to the secular system (Turkey's fo11T1er chief of staff rejects 'coup 
attempt' in e-memorandum testimony - Turkey News 2015) 
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Party-MHP), supported the change in the constitution. Hence, the amendment was 
approved by the parliament. As a result of approval, the tension increased in the 
secularist society. They protested saying "Turkey is laic and will stay laic" (Anayasa 
Mahkemesi Bal?6rtOsO OOzenlemesini lptal Etti 2008). Relying on the protest, 
Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya, the Chief Prosecutor applied to the constitutional court 
claiming that the amendment was against the constitution's corner stone, laicism. 
Even though the constitutional court did not abolish the AKP, the court annulled 
the amendment (Anayasa Mahkemesi turban dOzenlemesini iptal etti 2008). 
In the same year, 2008, Ergenekon which is known but less spoken 
secularist-ultra nationalist organization was being investigated. Even though the 
investigation remained until 2013, it played an essential role for AKP's power. 
According to the investigation, a group of people who were in the military or had 
possible ties with the military organized many terror operations for last 30 years 
(Jenkins 201 1 ) .  The investigation resulted in the hundreds of military officers 
conviction (0. Butler 2014). It was the beginning of transfer of power from the 
military to the AKP, in other words, to Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 
Consolidating his power, Erdogan offered a referendum to make some 
changes in the constitution. The conservative-religious people believe that with this 
change they would finally get their freedom of religion. The reform package not 
only included liberalization of the headscarf but also rights for the Kurdish people. 
Like the headscarf problem, Turkey has had a Kurdish problem since Ataturk's 
death. However, the Kurdish problem came to light after 1960s liberalization. The 
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libertarian environment made the extreme left wing stronger. The Left wing gave 
support to the Kurdish people who could not find a chance to become organized 
previously. Moreover, within economic liberalization in 1980s, the Kurdish people 
who live in the east part of the Turkey believed they were not being treated equally 
with western Turkish people. In the beginning of 1 970s, The Kurdish's Workers 
Party (PKK) was founded. 
According to the Turkish constitution, al l  people have equal rights. So, the 
Kurdish people have been protected like Turkish under the constitution and they 
were given the same rights as any other (TBMM 1 982, I .  1 0) .  However, the 
organization claimed in their founding statemen that the Kurds do not come from 
the same race as the Turks and since the foundation of Republic of Turkey, the 
Turkish state has been trying to assimilate and exploit them (PKK nas1I kuruldu ve 
gu9lendi? 2013).Relying on these assertions. PKK aimed to establish a new state 
in the Turkish Eastern Border including Turkey's southeastern part. Since then, the 
Turkish government believe that the PKK is a terrorist group and has to be 
destroyed. Moreover, after the 1990s PKK had organized many attacks not only 
the Turkish soldiers but also on civilians in the eastern part of Turkey. Therefore, 
the Turkish military has been battling with the PKK (Deli 2013; PKK nas1I kuruldu 
ve gu9lendi? 2013). The mil itary was in power for the nationalist problem, just like 
in the religious headscarf issue.However, with the democratic reform package, 
Erdogan provided a different point of view for the Kurdish problem. He asserted 
that those battles are not the solutions. the Republic of Turkey have a power to 
bring peaceful solution to this issue. Thus, the democratic reform package, which 
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was offered by Erdogan would give the recognition of the right to education in one's 
mother tongue, open a new TV channel in Kurdish language, and the any changes 
in their name of villages would be accepted (Hacaloglu 2013). Those reforms 
ensured the Kurdish people vote to reelect Erdogan. The reform package was 
accepted by 57.88% of the voters. As a result, the headscarf ban was annulled 
and the promises given to the Kurdish people were put in force (Cumhuriyet 2014). 
Voting Rates of Erdogan 
2002 2007 2010 R 2011 2015 R 2015 
FIGURE-6: Voting rates of Erdogan 
Source: Author's calculation based on Newspaper official statements for 
Venezuela's election, R: Referendum 
After the referendum, the general elections were held in 201 1 .  Erdogan 
received 49.83% of votes. This voti�g rate and his accomplishment gave Erdogan 
more power. So, after the constitutional changes, Erdogan abandoned 
liberalization. Instead, he gradually focused on monopolizing his power in Turkey. 
In the Turkish national elections, the AKP became Turkey's predominant party in 
201 1 (Gumuscu 2013). 
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While becoming stronger, The Fettullah Gulen's8 Cemaat9 had been a 
supporter of Erdogan. Cemaat had a strong influential in conservative parties since 
its foundation. Like any other predecessors, AKP were in a communication with 
Gulen who lives in the USA Both Gulen and Erdogan come from same cultural 
background. "They are both known as pious Muslims who opposed secularism and 
army's role in politics" (Gol 2016). Therefore, Gulen's followers supported Erdogan 
all the time. Erdogan's higher voting rate mostly came from Gulen's followers. As 
the voting rates displayed, Gulen was the strongest person in Turkey until 2013 
(Guercio 201 ?b, 55). While Gulen's followers supporting Erdogan, Erdogan was 
giving privileges to Gulen's school and its foundations. However, this relationship 
came to a dead end. When Erdogan won the 2013 elections, he decided to close 
down Gulen's prep-schools for the university entrance exam (Dershaneler resmen 
kapat1ld1 haberi 2014). The schools were a huge money resource for the Cemaat. 
Thus, the mutual cooperation turned into fierce hatred. This hostility met in the 
coup attempt in July 1 5, 2015. Erdogan claimed that Gulen movement was behind 
this attempt (Kasapoglu 2016). 
The public went out to the streets to protect democracy, or so it seemed. At 
first, some citizens thought that they would honestly protect democracy; however, 
the majority shouted out "I am going to die for Erdogan" (Ebebi Ehver 2016) 
Erdogan gave a direction to the public to protect their country. He mentioned that 
if someone dies for their country, they will be "$ehit" (according to Islam, $ehit 
8 The political figure in Turkey. He is known as a preacher. He founded the Gulen movement. 
9 Also known as the Gulen movement. It is an international Islamic and social movement. It has been 
effective in Turkey since 1969. 
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people will go directly to Heaven) (Yeni $afak 2018). He took advantage of the 
majority to protect his position. This was the next to last attack to take Turkey 
towards authoritarianism. 
Although he declared a state of emergency for a period of three months 
after the coup attempt, this declaration stayed in force until the last election. With 
this declaration, Erdogan ruled Turkey by decree. The government closed down 3 
news agencies, 16 television stations, 23 radio stations, 45 newspapers, 1 5  
magazines and 2 9  publishers. Thousands of people have been arrested as coup 
suspects and this has been continuing (The Government's Deepening Assault on 
Critical Journalism I HRW 2016). This failed attempt had given Erdogan what he 
wanted. He also rewrote the Turkish constitution via referendum in 2017. This is 
the last attack up against democracy. The Turkish Parliamentary system has been 
changed to the presidential system (Anayasa degi�ikligi ve Ba�kanllk sistemi 
maddeleri nelerdir? - 2017). Although the AKP and Erdogan have emphasized that 
these amendments will create democratic stabilization in the country, the 
amendments show that Erdogan will have all power in his hand. The new 
constitution annulled the power of the parliament; hence Erdogan has more room 
for his supporters under the roof of the parliament. Moreover, the control power of 
jurisdiction over the president was weakened. As a result, checks and balances in 
the Turkish system was diminished. 
Turkey's economy is still under control. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)'s 2017 data, Turkey is an emerging market (IMF 2017b). As 
it is reported by World Bank Statistics and IMF's Statistics, Turkey has the world's 
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1 8th largest nominal GDP (IMF 2017a; World Bank 2016). Whereas Venezuela's 
inflation rate, after 2013,  has been increasing restrain, Turkey's inflation rate is 
stable. It can be seen in the Figure-4 (above). As it is seen in the Figure-7, although 
both countries have economic fluctuations, Turkey's Real GDP growth has never 
experienced a trough since the election of Erdogan, like what Venezuela have 
been experiencing since 2016. These statistics demonstrate that there is not a 
chance that Turkey is en route of authoritarianism as a result of economic crisis. 






Real GDP growth (Annual percent change) 
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EAMJ. 2018, S<>ur<•· Wot'Cf lconomte Outloo': (Octot>f'r 2018) 
FIGURE-7: Real GDP growth (Annual percent change) 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, Accessed November 25,2018 
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
DISCUSSION 
Democratization is a challenging process for countries. Even if a powerful 
democratic country demands to maintain its democratic position, it has to put in 
the effort. However, leaders are not willing to give up their seat. 
Chavez, Madura, and Erdogan are representatives of this argument. For 
example, whenever Erdogan realized he had more power, he rewrote the Turkish 
constitution to change the parliamentary system to the presidential system in 2017 
through a referendum. He got all his power depending on people who has sensitive 
political issues. He received 51 % of the vote as yes to change the Turkish 
Constitution (NlV 2017). Like Erdogan, when Chavez had the power, he also 
rewrote the constitution of Venezuela. In 2000, Chavez got all the power and 
diminished parliament. Although the military attempted the coup, they failed in 
2002. There were so many supporters of Chavez in that time (Canache 2012). 
Because of his popularity, he was elected as president getting 58% of the public 
vote. He did anything for the public to maintain his popularity. However, his 
popularity did not bring wealth to the country, rather Venezuela is a country that 
while its citizens starve to death, it has the largest oil reserves in the world. 
Because Chavez took advantages of under-represent parts of society, he easily 
managed to become an authoritarian leader. 
Another main point of the thesis is what the dynamics of authoritarianism in 
both countries is. These findings and articles demonstrate that both Venezuela and 
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Turkey are on their way to authoritarian regimes. There are many ways to diverge 
from democracy. Political and economic policies can count one of them. Whereas 
Venezuela took steps to become an authoritarian country by using economic 
policies, Turkey's steps were on political policies. When statistics, taken from 
reliable institutions and information are taken from articles and newspapers are put 
together, they stand behind my hypothesis. 
Relying on the results, I would assert this research is valuable for studies of 
authoritarianism and democratization. It reveals what kind of dynamics can lead 
the countries toward authoritarianism. Therefore, the paper would assist 
researchers of democratization and authoritarianism. However, without exception, 
all research has limitations in many ways. Not only is this study limited by two 
countries data but also is limited by countries' data. There might be the countries 
which would have the same problems display different results. Therefore, the 
generalizability of the results is scant. In addition, this study is not elaborative of 
the quantitative data. Since the indicated countries lack government transparency, 
the accessibility of the quantitative data was almost insignificant. Moreover, some 
of Venezuela's official government web pages were in only Spanish. It raises 
accessibility problems. Since the research is mostly done with qualitative 
methods, I used newspapers and magazines as my main data; however, the media 
would not be objective in such countries. While partisan presses glorify 
governments, opponents have more negative interpretation than it is. 
Since democratization still is a popular issue, my research also has many 
implications for future researchers, specifically for the researchers who are 
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interested in authoritarianism and democratization. Even though Venezuela's and 
Turkey's authoritarianism derive from different reasons, the findings display that 
the steps towards authoritarianism are almost exactly the same. Therefore, the 
inclusion of the other counties will allow more accurate results. In addition, during 
analysis of the findings, the rhetoric of the leaders on indicated policies (economic 
and politics) draw attention. In the next research, the hypothesis would be 
analyzed in two steps to set a broad sample. In this case, the first step should be 
analyzing the effect of the rhetorics on the economy and politics. Afterward, it 
should be analyzed whether the policies determined by rhetoric change the country 
regime. However, such extensive research requires more time and resources. 
In conclusion, although both countries have free elections, their policies do 
not support democracy anymore. However, the Venezuelan and Turkish masses 
still support democracy. The public of both countries are not the supporters of the 
authoritative regime. It is ambiguous how the support of democracy by the public 
will affect the countries. The returning back to democracy will not be easy for the 
countries, if they persist on their current policies. 
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